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FEATURE

ARTICLE

The Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act
Recent Developments
by DanielA. Edelman

I.

Introduction

In 1977, Congress enacted the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").' The
FDCPA regulates the conduct of "debt collectors" in collecting "debts" owed or allegedly
owed by "consumers."
The FDCPA is based on the premise
"[t]hat every individual, whether or not he owes
the debt, has a right to be treated in a reasonable
and civil manner."2 Congress recognized and
accordingly, articulated the purposes for the enactment of the FDCPA as follows:
[There is] universal agreement among
scholars, law enforcement officials, and
even debt collectors that the number of persons who willfully refuse to pay just debts
is miniscule [sic]. ... [T]he vast majority of
consumers who obtain credit fully intend
to repay their debts. When default occurs,
it is nearly always due to an unforeseen
event such as unemployment, overextension, serious illness, or marital difficulties
or divorce.
There is abundant evidence of the use of
abusive, deceptive and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors. Abusive debt collection practices contribute to
the number of personal bankruptcies, to
marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and
to invasions of personal privacy. 4
1996

Congress stated that the purpose of the
FDCPA was to eliminate these practices and
"to insure that those debt collectors who
refrain from using abusive debt collection
practices are not competitively disadvantaged."5 This article addresses recent issues
which have arisen concerning the application of the FDCPA.
Coverage and definitions
A.

What is a "Debt"

The FDCPA applies to attempts to collect a "debt." The FDCPA defines debt as "any
obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer
to pay money arising out of a transaction in
which the money, property, insurance or services
which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been
reduced to judgment." 6 As such, business and
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agricultural loans are not debts covered by the should be used to limit the definition of debt in
FDCPA.7 On the other hand, a credit card used the FDCPA. Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate
primarily to purchase items from retail merchants Group 3 is cited for this proposition. In
catering to consumers is covered even though it Zimmerman, the Third Circuit affirmed the disis also used for a few "business" purchases. 8
missal of plaintiff's FDCPA complaint based on
a demand letter sent to persons who allegedly
intercepted and stole cable signals. 4 The court
1.
Debts reduced to
held that the illegal interception of signals was
judgment
not a consensual "transaction" and, therefore, not
15
The FDCPA covers consumer debts recovered under the FDCPA definition of debt.
9
duced to judgment. However, in McCarthy v. The court stated:
Rosenthal,the District of Maryland recently held
that a settlement agreement resolving a lawsuit
We find that the type of transaction which
brought to collect a consumer debt was not covmay give rise to a "debt" as defined in the
ered because the plaintiff "did not incur this obFDCPA is the same type of transaction as
ligation to receive consumer goods or services." 0
is dealt with in all other subchapters of the
This holding is clearly wrong; the Act does not
Consumer Credit Protection Act, i.e., one
require that the obligation be incurred to receive
involving the offer or extension of credit to
consumer goods or services. Rather, a debt is
a consumer. Specifically it is a transaction
"any obligation.., to pay money arising out of a
in which a consumer is offered or extended
transaction" for consumer goods or services."
to acquire "money, property, insurance, or
The settlement agreement is an "obligation to pay
services" which are "primarily for house6
money" arising from such a transaction. Furtherhold purposes" and to defer payment.'
more, the FDCPA covers this type of obligation
even if it "has been reduced to judgment." ThereIn Zimmerman, no issue existed as to
fore, if collection of a judgment resulting from a whether issuance
of a check to pay for goods or
consumer contract is covered by the Act, an services
constituted an FDCPA transaction.
equivalent settlement agreement should also be While the Zimmerman court referred to FDCPA
covered.
transactions as involving the same sort of cir2.

Dishonored checks

Recently, the issue of whether dishonored
checks are debts within the meaning of the
FDCPA has arisen in a number of cases. Debt
collectors persistently contend that a dishonored
check is not a "debt."'' 2 The basic argument proffered by the debt collectors is that the definition
of "credit" in theTruth in LendingAct ("TILA")
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cumstances as other matters regulated by the
Consumer Credit Protection Act ("CCPA"), the
CCPA covers far more than just credit sales, including transactions which are the functional
equivalent of the issuance of a check.' 7 The
FDCPA definition of creditor, clearly broader
than the TILA definition, includes not only someone who "offers or extends credit," but anyone
to "whom a debt is owed." 8
The overwhelming majority of decisions
Volume 8, number 4
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either hold that dishonored checks issued by the
debtor for consumer goods or services fall within
the FDCPA, or apply the FDCPA to such debts.' 9
Furthermore, the statutory definitions clearly
encompass dishonored checks because liability
on such a check is an "alleged obligation ... to

pay money arising out of a transaction," subject
to the FDCPA if the "property... which [is] the
subject of the transaction" was "primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes."20
Moreover, the FDCPA legislative history
clearly states that dishonored checks fall under
the Act. The Report of the House Banking Committee accompanying H.R. 529421 states:

tion of a check should not be covered is one
where no "transaction" transpired. Thus, the
statutory liability of a prior endorser on a deposited or cashed checks which thereafter is returned
for insufficient funds is not a "debt. '26 In this
situation no purchase of goods or services for
consumer purposes occurred.
3.

Rent and
condominium
assessments

An issue analogous to the dishonored
check issue involves attempts to collect rent.
Typically, the tenant is expected to pay for each
month's tenancy, in advance, prior to actual ocOpponents of this legislation claim that,
cupancy. Notwithstanding the absence of an exregardless of the amount of consumer hatension of credit in the sense of incurring an obrassment or deception, there should be no
ligation and repaying it over time with interest,
legislation because the number of unpaid
an obligation exists to pay money in the future
bills and bad checks keeps increasing. This
as part of a consensual transaction. In Travieso
reasoning is misleading. The issue is not one
v. Gutman, the Eastern District of New York had
of uncollected debts, but rather whether or
no difficulty in concluding that rent was a debt
not consumers must lose their civil rights
to which the FDCPA applied.27 The court stated,
and be terrorized and abused by unethical
"rent clearly fits [within] the definition of debt
debt collectors.22
' 28
embodied in the FDCPA.
On the other hand, several recent federal
The House Report also stated that "the
district court decisions from Illinois and Florida
committee intends that the term debt include conhave held that condominium assessments are not
sumer obligations paid by check or other non"debts," refusing to follow contrary FTC staff
23
credit consumer obligations.
opinions. 29 The conclusions from these courts apThe Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")
pear erroneous because a condominium assesshas brought several civil actions against debt
ment is functionally equivalent to rent-an oblicollectors based on attempts to collect dishongation to pay money in the future incident to a
ored checks.2 4 In addition, the FTC staff com"transaction." The purchase of the condominium
mentary on the FDCPA illustrates the definition
by the debtor or his predecessor in interest is the
of debt with the example of an NSF check used
transaction, and results in an obligation to pay
to purchase goods or services intended for housemonthly assessments for the upkeep of the comhold or personal use.25
mon areas.
The only situation in which the collec1996
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of debt collector37 unless the creditor uses a name
which suggests that a third-party debt collector
is involved in the collection process. 8 Additional
A recent Eastern District of Pennsylva- exclusions from the definition of debt collector
nia decision, Adams v. Law Offices of Stuckert include: (1) officers and employees of the credi& Yates, rejected a debt collector's contention tor while collecting the debt in the creditor's
that a medical bill was not a "debt" because it name; (2) affiliates of the creditor; (3) officers
should have been paid by the patient's insurance or employees of the United States or any state;
carrier.30 The court reasoned that the method of (4) process servers; (5) bona fide non-profit debt
retiring the outstanding debt, either from the counselors; (6) persons who service debts which
patient's checking account or pursuant to his are not in default (e.g., servicers of mortgages
contract with a health insurance carrier, played and student loans) 39; and (7) fiduciaries.'
no role in defining whether a debt existed. 3'
4.

Debts expected to be
paid by a third party

5.

Other "Debt" issues

Liabilities for per capita taxes32 and child
support obligations33 are not considered debts
within the FDCPA. In addition, liability under
an Ohio statute for civil damages arising from
alleged shoplifting is not a debt within the coverage of the FDCPA.3 4 Finally, tort claims arising from the illegal reception of television signals are not within the definition of "debt."35

1.

Creditor who uses
name indicating third
party involvement as
"Debt Collector"

Creditors may make themselves "debt
collectors" by using names which falsely indicate the involvement of third party debt collectors or attorneys. The simplest situation covered
by the "other name" exception of the FDCPA
occurs when a creditor sends letters to its debtors demanding payment under the name of either a totally fictitious entity or a real entity which
Who is a "Debt Collector"
B.
has no significant involvement in the collection
Generally, the FDCPA covers the activi- of the creditor's debts. The use of the false name
ties of a "debt collector." The definition of debt simultaneously (1)subjects the creditor to the
FDCPA and (2) violates the Act's prohibition
collector has two parts:
against deceptive collection practices.4
In order to prevent evasion of the law,
Any person [1] who uses any instruthe FTC and the courts have applied the "false
mentality of interstate commerce or the
names" exception to more complex situations
mails in any business the principal purpose
where a creditor uses, or authorizes the use of, a
of which is the collection of any debts, or
name other than the one under which the credi[2] who regularly collect or attempts to coltor dealt with the consumer and which is likely
lect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due
36
to lead the consumer to believe that a third party
or asserted to be owed or due another.
is attempting to collect the debt. For example, a
The creditor is excluded from the definition creditor cannot evade the intent of the FDCPA
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through the simple device of incorporating a
wholly-owned subsidiary, called XYZ Collection
Agency Corporation, and then sending out collection letters using that name.
The FTC stated that if a creditor uses a
name "other than [the creditor's] own" name,
then on its face, such conduct "would indicate
that a third person is collecting or attempting to
collect [the creditor's] debts."'42 Even if the creditor or an affiliate lawfully owns the name used
to make collection, the creditor must disclose the
relationship between the name used in dealing
with the consumer prior to default and the name
used in attempting to collect after default.43 The
FTC staff commentary expressly imposes this
standard on "affiliates" of a creditor." Similarly,
courts have indicated that all of the FDCPA exceptions for persons associated with creditors and
for servicers are subject to the qualification that
there can be no use of a name which conveys the
false impression of involvement by an independent third-party debt collector.
One illustration of this principle comes
from Grammatico v. Sterling, Inc.,4 where the
court rejected a store owner's claim that it came
within the "affiliated creditor exception." Sterling owned a jewelry store, Kay, and collected
Kay's accounts using the name "Sterling" without disclosure of any relationship between Sterling and Kay. Sterling argued that because it
owned Kay it came within the "affiliated creditor exemption." The court held that the various
provisions of the FDCPA must be read together
and in light of its statutory purpose. Accordingly,
the court concluded that the FDCPA applies to
the situation where company "A" collected debts
for related company "B" without disclosure of
the relationship and under circumstances where
a consumer would believe that a third party was
collecting the outstanding debt. The court stated,
1996

"it's the impact on the consumer, not the technical corporate realities of the situation, which
govern the application of the second sentence."'
Neither the "own name" language nor the "affiliated creditor" exemption of the FDCPA permitted such deception to be practiced on the consumer.
Likewise, in Little v. World Fin. Network,

Inc.,4'

the court foundWorld Financial Network,
a corporate affiliate of Lane Bryant, satisfied the
requirements of a debt collector under the
FDCPA by collecting a debt owed Lane Bryant
using the name "World Financial Network" without any disclosure of the connection between
Lane Bryant and World Financial Network.
Britton v. Weiss4 8 provides additional
guidance on the disclosure issue. In Britton, a
consumer received a collection letter purporting
to emanate from an independent law office. Actually, the creditor employed the attorney in its
in-house law department. While employees of
creditors, like affiliates of the creditor, are normally not debt collectors, the letter conveyed the
false impression that it came from an independent law office:
Plaintiff claims here that the March 6, 1988
letter from defendant was deceptive, that defendant clearly represented himself as an
independent attorney not collecting debts
in the name of the creditor, and that defendant is therefore covered by the terms of
the FDCPA. Plaintiff points out that the letter was not written on NYT stationery which
bears the well-known "blue bell" logo.
While the letter does refer to New York Telephone in the street address, it is printed in
small, lower case type. On the other hand,
plaintiff states, the designation "attorney"
below defendant's signature is in upper-case
Feature Article * 307

letters. Indeed, as plaintiff asserts, it might
appear to a debtor that defendant was an
independent attorney who had offices in a
New York Telephone building, since there
is no other representation that he is an employee or otherwise affiliated with the telephone company. The letter, plaintiff maintains, was an attempt to deceive the plaintiff into believing that this was not merely a
communication from the collection department of NYT, but a more serious step in the
collection process: the intervention of a private attorney. 49

against you for the recovery of the full balance.... " While the words "New York Telephone" appear in small print, it is clear that
the "least sophisticated consumer" could
believe that the account was being handled
by an independent collection agency, with
all the attendant serious consequences for
the consumer.5 0

Conversely, in Dickenson v. Townside TV
& Appliance, Inc., the court held that a creditor
which consistently used its assumed business
name in dealing with customers, rather than its
incorporated name, did not thereby become a
The court, citing the aforementioned FTC "debt collector."'" Other courts have held that
materials, agreed that the letter conveyed the false corporate affiliates with similar names could take
impression that it came from an independent at- advantage of the "affiliated creditor" exception,52
and that a "collection department" of the creditorney:
tor is not subject to the FDCPA.53
A plain reading of the March 6, 1988 letter
from defendant to plaintiff is indicative of
2.
Purchasers of loan
defendant's intent to deceive plaintiff into
portfolios including
defaulted debts
believing he was an independent attorney.
The letter is not written on stationery bearA financial institution which purchases
ing the logo of NYT. Defendant is identidelinquent debts is a debt collector within the
fied at the bottom of the letter simply as an
meaning of the FDCPA with respect to the de"attorney," and he in no way indicates that
linquent debts. "The legislative history of seche is an employee of NYT. Several passages
tion 1692a(6) [which defines debt collector] inin the letter indicate that defendant intends
dicates conclusively that a debt collector does
the plaintiff to believe he is acting on his
not include ... an assignee of a debt, as long as
own, and not on behalf of NYT: "Your
the debt was not in default at the time it was asformer telephone account has been referred
signed." 54 Conversely, the assignee of a debt
to me for collection"; "I am writing to perwhich is in default at the time of the assignment
mit you to pay this debt at a reasonable rate
meets the standards of a "debt collector" if the
per month"; "All payments must be made
assignee's principal purpose entails the collecdirectly to my office"; "So long as you abide
tion of debts or the assignee regularly 55 engages
by the above terms and conditions, I shall
in the collection of debts. For example, "a morttake no further action"; "However, should
gage servicing company is not considered a debt
you fail to make any monthly payment, I
collector when it acquires loans originated by
shall immediately commence a lawsuit
308 e Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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others and not in default at the time acquired.
However, to the extent the mortgage servicing
company receives delinquent accounts for collection it is a debt collector with respect to those
56
accounts.
The FTC has expressed agreement that,
under the current language of the FDCPA, the
test of whether an assignee is a debt collector
depends on whether the particular debt was in
default at the time of its acquisition. In late 1993,
the FTC proposed amending the FDCPA so that
whether an assignee was a debt collector would
"depend upon the nature of the overall business
conducted by the party to be exempted rather than
the status of individual obligations when the party
obtained them. '57 However, the proposal was
not adopted, and the test of whether an assignee
is a debt collector under the FDCPA remains the
status of individual obligations when they were
acquired by the party collecting them.
Under this test, a company which acquires a block of receivables is a debt collector
with respect to those receivables in default at the
time of acquisition. For instance, in Kimber v.
FederalFin. Corp.,58 a purchaser of credit card
receivables was held to be a "debt collector" with
respect to those receivables that were delinquent
at the time they were acquired. The court stated:
The first part of §I692a (4) defines the universe of creditors as either those who originate a debt or those to whom a debt is owed;
in either case, the creditors are not collecting the debts for others. The second part of
§ I692a(4), the assignee exception, then purports to exclude from this universe those
persons who collect assigned or transferred
debts that are already in default when assigned or transferred. To say that this exception applies only to those who collect
1996

debts for others would be to render the exception superfluous and meaningless; those
who collect debts for others are not in the
original definitional universe, and there is
therefore no need to exclude them. Rather,
the excluding factors in the exception are
that the debts are the result of an assignment or transfer and that the debts were already in default at the time of assignment
or transfer.With the phrase 'for another' at
the end of the exception, Congress merely
intended that the debts should have originally belonged to another and that the creditor was therefore in effect a third-party or
independent creditor.59
Similarly, in Cirkot v. Diversified Sys.,' ° the
Connecticut District Court held that an entity
which attempted to collect delinquent debts in
loan portfolios acquired through the FDIC from
defunct banks is a debt collector covered by the
FDCPA with respect to the delinquent debts.6'
Thus, "[b]anks are not debt collectors if
they service debts that they originated or debts
that were not in default when obtained by the
bank. However, if a bank services a loan portfolio, it is a debt collector for those loans in the
portfolio that it did not originate and which were
in default when obtained."6
3.

Lawyers as "Debt
Collectors"

Originally, the definition of "debt collector"-one who "regularly" collects consumer
debts-excluded lawyers. However, in 1986,
63
Congress removed the attorney exemption.
Now, the "FDCPA does apply to a lawyer...
with a general practice including a minor but
regular practice in debt collection."' The legisFeatureArticle * 309

lative history of the amendment reveals ineffec- is the volume of the attorney's debt collection
tive policing by the legal profession and courts efforts that is dispositive, not the percentage such
7
of collection attorneys. The removal of the ex- efforts amount to in the attorney's practice." '
emption, therefore, was necessary to "put a stop However, a percentage threshold and a "holding
to the abusive and harassing tactics of attorney out" test are also necessary because the FDCPA
debt collectors. '65 The United States Supreme should apply to: (1) a lawyer with a nascent pracCourt, in Heintz v. Jenkins,66 held that litigation tice which includes consumer debt collection, and
conduct of attorneys in collecting consumer debts (2) a lawyer who actively attempts to obtain colis not exempt from the FDCPA and rejected the lection business (notwithstanding his lack of sucarguments of the collection bar to the contrary. cess in acquiring a substantial amount). The deThe amount of collection activity neces- cisions indicate the volume threshold ranges from
sary to make a lawyer a "debt collector" is mini- of five to ten attempts to collect consumer debts
mal. For instance, a law firm's debt collection per year, and the percentage threshold hovers in
work, which amounted to less than 4% of its to- the five percent range.72
tal business, brought the firm within the definition. 67 "While the ratio of debt collection to other
4.
Other "Debt
efforts may be small, the actual volume is suffiCollector" issues
cient to bring [a] defendant under the Act's defiThe franchisor of a check collection comnition of 'debt collector."' 68 Thus, an attorney
pany,
with
control over its franchisee, is covered
who represented four collection agencies, filed
73
over 150 collection suits in a two-year period by the FDCPA. Also, check guaranty agencies,
and sent one particular collection letter over 125 which purchase dishonored checks from merthem from consumers,
times in a 14-month period was a debt collector chants and seek to collect
74 However, repossession
are
debt
collectors.
even though debt collection was merely incidental to his primary law practice.69 On the other agencies are generally not debt collectors within
hand, an attorney who collected less than 20 con- the FDCPA unless they perform common coldunning letters
sumer debts in a 10-year period was not a debt lection services such as sending
75
or making telephone calls.
collector.7 °
A lawyer should be classified as a debt
C.
Consumer
collector if either a volume threshold or a percentage-of-time threshold is met or if the lawyer
Only the collection of consumer debts are
holds himself out as engaging in consumer debt
covered by the FDCPA. Under the FDCPA, a
collection. A volume threshold is necessary be- "consumer" is "any natural person obligated
or
cause a law firm that handles a modest number
76
allegedly obligated to pay any debt." This defiof consumer collection matters as part of pronition gives a consumer's executor standing to
viding a full range of services to its clients should
bring an FDCPA action.77 It should be noted,
be required to comply with the FDCPA. In an
however, that certain substantive protections of
Eastern District of Michigan case, Stojanovski v.
78
the FDCPA are not limited to "consumers.
Strobl & Manoogian,P.C., the court held that "it
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D.

Communication

Certain substantive prohibitions of the
FDCPA apply to "communications." Communications include "the conveying of information
regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium."79 Usually communications falling under the provisions of the FDCPA
take the form of dunning letters or telephone
calls. However, the term is broadly and literally
construed to encompass other forms of conveying information as well."°

split hairs. Anyway it's viewed, the standard is low, close to the bottom of the sophistication meter.

Gammon does not significantly change the
substance of the "least sophisticated consumer"
standard as it had been routinely applied by
courts. Instead, Gammon concluded that the term
"unsophisticated consumer" is a simpler and less
confusing formulation of a standard designed to
protect those of below-average sophistication or
intelligence. As a result, the court stated "we will
use the term, 'unsophisticated,' instead of the
phrase, 'least sophisticated,' to describe the hyIII. Violations
pothetical consumer whose reasonable percepLeast sophisticated or
A.
tions will be used to determine if collection mesunsophisticated consumer
sages are deceptive or misleading." Gammon, 27
standard
F.3d at 1257. The new terminology reconciles
Generally, courts in determining whether the former standard's literal meaning with its
a communication or other conduct violates the application. Id. As Avila correctly observes, the
FDCPA, analyze the conduct from the perspec- unsophisticated consumer standard is a distinctive of the "least sophisticated consumer."'8 This tion without much of a practical difference in
86
standard ensures "that the FDCPA protects all application.
consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd." 2
The court inAvila also rejected a defense
In Gannon v. G. C. Servs. L.P., the Seventh Circuit held that a violation should be de- contention that it is necessary to prove, by direct
termined from the perspective of the "unsophis- testimony or survey evidence, that a collection
ticated consumer. '83 Since the "least sophisti- notice actually misled someone:
cated consumer" has never been interpreted to
We also think the defendants' reliance on
impose liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic in84
false advertising cases from trademark law
terpretations of collection demands, it does not
is unavailing here. Section 43(a)(2) of the
appear that the difference in language represents
Lanham Act prohibits statements that are
a significant difference in substance. Most re(1) literally false and (2) statements that,
cently, the Seventh Circuit confirmed the lack of
while literally not false or ambiguous, consignificant difference between the two standards
5
vey a false impression or are misleading in
in Avila v. Rubin:
context. See Abbott Laboratoriesv. Mead
& Co., 971 F.2d 6, 13 (7th Cir.
Johnson
but
we
today,
our
standard
We reiterate
1992). The general rule is that if a statedon't want to be involved in the splitting of

1996
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ment is literally false, the court may grant
relief without reference to the reaction of
buyers or consumers of the product. On the
other hand, if a statement is not literally
false, the court may find that it is impliedly
misleading only if presented with evidence
of actual consumer deception. Id. at 14.
Avila claims Van Ru contradicted the validation notice and that Rubin both contradicted the validation notice and improperly
sent attorney form letters. These claims resemble a literally false statement more than
an ambiguous but potentially misleading
statement. Just as the analysis involved in
evaluating a literally false statement turns
on whether the statement is true or false,
the language in the collection letters either
contradicts the validation notice or it does
not.87

(1) the amount of the debt;
(2) the name of the creditor to whom the
debt is owed;
(3) a statement that unless the consumer,
within thirty days after receipt of notice,
disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be
valid by the debt collector;
(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the
thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector
will obtain verification of the debt or a copy
of a judgment against the consumer and a
copy of such verification or judgment will
be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and
(5) a statement that, upon the consumer's
written request within the thirty-day period,
the debt collector will provide the consumer
with the name and address of the original
creditor, if different from the current credi-

Under either the "least sophisticated" or
89
"unsophisticated" consumer standard, a collector.
tion communication which can plausibly be read
in two or more ways, at least one of which is
These warnings are commonly referred to as
88
"civil Mirandawarnings" by debt collectors. The
misleading, violates the law.
FDCPA further provides that if the consumer
B.
Validation or verification
disputes the debt, the collector must cease further collection efforts until the validation procenotice
dure is satisfied. 9°
The FDCPA provides:
It is not enough for a debt collector to
include notice somewhere on the collection let(a) Within five days after the initial comter.9' The validation notice may not be either
munication with a consumer in connection
"overshadowed" or "contradicted" by other lanwith the collection of any debt, a debt colguage or material in the original or subsequent
lector shall, unless the following informacollection letters. 92 "A notice is overshadowing
tion is contained in the initial communicaor contradictory if it would make the least sotion or the consumer has paid the debt, send
phisticated consumer uncertain as to her rights. 93
the consumer a written notice containing Recent cases hold that any contradiction
312 e Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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which has an overshadowing or contradictory
effect contravenes the Act.9 4 A "threatening" or
visually overshadowed contradiction contained
within the required within the required notice
need not be established.95 In other words, either
a contradiction or overshadowing is sufficient to
violate the FDCPA.
An example of an "overshadowing" case
96
is Miller v. Payco-General Am. Credits, Inc.,
where a debt collector's "screaming headlines,
bright colors and huge lettering" utilizing the
language "IMMEDIATE FULL PAYMENT,"
"PHONE US TODAY," and "NOW," were held
to have overshadowed the 30-day validation notice. A collection letter from an attorney demanding payment within ten days upon the threat of
suit also contradicted the 30-day validation notice.97 Similarly, demands for an "immediate"
response have been held to overshadow and contradict the validation notice. 98
Where the validation notice is placed on
the back of the correspondence without a legible
and reasonably prominent reference thereto on
the front, the FDCPA is violated. 99 Requests that
the consumer telephone the debt collector, which
effectively induce the consumer to waive his right
to verification because a written request is necessary, also violate § 1692g.100
The FTC staff has stated that a debt collector may not charge for furnishing validation
information. A 1996 Florida District Court decision, Sandlin v. Shapiro & Fishman, held that
such a charge did not violate § 1692g per se, but
found it unlawful under § 1692f on the ground
that it was not authorized by contract or law.' 0'
Another court held that if the debt collector
ceases collection efforts upon receipt of a request
to validate the debt, the failure to furnish validating information is not a violation of the
FDCPA. i02
1996

C.

Threats of unintended,
unauthorized or illegal
action

The FDCPA prohibits "the threat to take
any action that cannot legally be taken or that is
not intended to be taken."' °3 With increasing frequency, collectors are using letters which seek
amounts in addition to the face amount of dishonored checks and which threaten the consumers with criminal prosecution or liability for
multiple damages or civil penalties. If the collector states or implies that it regularly prosecutes
criminally when in fact such message is false,
the communications violate theAct. The FDCPA
is also violated if the collector misstates the
consumer's liability for multiple damages or civil
penalties. For instance, a collector violates the
Act by implying that a consumer's treble damage liability is absolute when the consumer has
a right to tender the check amount and avoid liability prior to trial or where a statutory notice is
a precondition to liability and no such notice has
04
been given. 1
Other examples of violations involving
threats of unintended, unauthorized, or illegal
action include:
1. Threats of suit within a short time
when the creditor has not authorized suit or
the debt collector does not file suit within
05
the period stated.
2. Threats of suit by an attorney not licensed within the jurisdiction or who does
not file suits in the jurisdiction; 106
3. Threats to take collection action by a
debt collector that is required to be, but is
07
not, licensed in the jurisdiction; 1
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4. Threats to file suit in a forum where
suit cannot legally be filed under 15 U.S.C.
10 8
§1692i.
5. Threats to enforce creditor remedies
which cannot be enforced at the time stated
or to the extent stated. For example, a debt
collector may threaten to obtain a wage garnishment or execution without disclosing
that this can only be completed after notice, hearing, and judgment. Similarly, a
debt collector may threaten to garnish "all"
of a consumer's wages when the law clearly
imposes limitations on the amount which
may be garnished. 0 9
D.

"Debt Padding"

In addition to "the threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not
intended to be taken,""' the FDCPA prohibits
"[t]he collection of any amount (including any
interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the
principal obligation) unless that amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the
debt or permitted by law.""'I This practice is typically referred to as "debt padding." In West v.
Costen,"I2 the court interpreted the language of
the Act to require either: (1) an express agreement-lawful under applicable state and federal
law-for the addition of interest or other charges
to the principal amount of a debt, or (2) a statute
or common-law principle that permits the addition of interest or other charges to the debt even
if not specifically provided for by agreement.
Debt padding is perhaps the most common violation of the "unfair practice" provision
of the Act. Typical violations include the imposition of service charges for bad checks where
not permitted by agreement and applicable state
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law," 3 the imposition of attorney's fees where
no contract or statute authorizes them,' "I the addition of unauthorized insurance charges,' 5 and
other forms of "debt padding."" 16
7
In Newman v. Checkrite of Cal., Inc.,1
the Eastern District of California made a number of significant rulings regarding the addition
of "service charges" and similar fees to the face
amount of dishonored checks: (1) "Service
charges" could not be added to the amounts of
dishonored checks on the basis of posted signs
unless there was evidence that the check writer
actually saw the sign, or that the charges otherwise actually formed part of the contract entered
into with the consumer; (2) For such charges to
be valid as incidental damages under the Uniform Commercial Code, debt collectors must
establish that "the amount of their service charges
is a commercially reasonable incidental damage
to the merchant," and the debt collector cannot
accomplish this "by referring to its own charge
to the merchant as evidence of reasonable or actual cost[.]"; and, (3)The debt collector violates
the FDCPA by describing demands for additional
fees using names such as "legal notice fees" or
"legal consideration for covenant not to sue."
These names imply that they are authorized legal expenses or obligatory payments to avoid suit.
Under this decision, it is impermissible
for a debt collector to send out mass-produced
form letters demanding fees in addition to the
face amount of dishonored checks. State law,
however, may authorize the automatic addition
of a fee to a dishonored check. Some states, including Illinois, authorize modest charges of this
8
nature, generally in the $20-30 range. "1
A recent decision, Ducrest v. Alco Collections, Inc.,"'9 held that "debt padding" violations require proof of knowledge and intent, and
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that the debt collector can rely on the creditor's
statement of the amount due, even where charges
have been added to the principal amount of the
debt. The decision appears plainly wrong. The
20
FDCPA imposes strict liability in most cases.'
Those sections which were meant to impose a
negligence, knowledge, or intent requirement do
so explicitly. 12' Furthermore, the FDCPA provides a general defense of bona fide error and
lack of intent,' 22 which would be meaningless if
intent or knowledge were part of a plaintiff's
case.
E.

False representation that
communication is from an attorney

Another popular debt collection technique is to have large numbers of collection letters, with implicit or explicit threats of suit, sent
under the name of an attorney. The clear implication of any attorney letter is a threat of suit.
Unless the attorney has in fact reviewed the
debtor's file and made a professional judgment
that the threatened action is appropriate and the
threatened action has been authorized by the
creditor, the use of such letters violates the Act's
prohibition of "the false representation or implication that any individual is an attorney or that
any communication is from an attorney." ' 23
For example, in Clomon v. Jackson,'24 the

Second Circuit found that the use of an attorney's
name in the letterhead and at the conclusion of
the debt collector's dunning letter, where the attorney did not review the file, violated the
FDCPA. The court concluded that "there will be
few, if any, cases in which a mass-produced collection letter bearing the facsimile of an
attorney's signature will comply with the restrictions imposed by [the Act]." ' ' 25 The court's ra-
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tionale is based on the fact that "a debt collection letter on an attorney's letterhead conveys
26
authority and credibility."
In Avila v. Rubin, 27 the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that:

[A]n attorney sending dunning letters must
be directly and personally involved in the
mailing of the letters in order to comply with
the strictures of the FDCPA. This may include reviewing the file of individual debtors to determine if and when a letter should
be sent or approving the sending of letters
28
based on the recommendations of others.1
An unsophisticated consumer, getting a letter from an "attorney," knows the price of
poker has just gone up. And that clearly is
the reason why the dunning campaign escalates from the collection agency, which
might not strike fear in the heart of the consumer, to the attorney, who is better positioned to get the debtor's knees knocking.
A letter from an attorney implies that a real
lawyer, acting like a lawyer usually acts, directly controlled or supervised the process
through which the letter was sent. That's the
essence of the connotation that accompanies the title of "attorney." A debt collection letter on an attorney's letterhead conveys authority. Consumers are inclined to
more quickly react to an attorney's threat
than to one coming from a debt collection
agency. It is reasonable to believe that a dunning letter from an attorney threatening legal action will be more effective in collecting a debt than a letter from a collection
agency. The attorney letter implies that the
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attorney has reached a considered, professional judgment that the debtor is delinquent
and is a candidate for legal action. And the
letter also implies that the attorney has some
personal involvement in the decision to send
the letter. Thus, if a debt collector (attorney
or otherwise) wants to take advantage of the
special connotation of the word "attorney"
in the minds of delinquent consumer debtors to better effect collection of the debt,
the debt collector should at least ensure that
an attorney has become professionally involved in the debtor's file. Any other result
would sanction the wholesale licensing of
an attorney's name for commercial purposes, in derogation of professional standards:
[A] lawyer has been given certain privileges
by the state. Because of these privileges,
letters... purporting to be written by attorneys have a greater weight than those written by laymen. But such privileges are
strictly personal, granted only to those who
are found through personal examination to
measure up to the required standards. Public policy therefore requires that whatever
correspondence purports to come from a
lawyer in his official capacity must be at
least passed upon and approved by him. He
cannot delegate this duty of approval to one
who has not been given the right to exercise the functions of a lawyer.'2 9

cases, attorneys purportedly sent out collection
letters at the rate of 60,000 per month. "If there
has been no individualized review of a debtor's
case, a communication from that attorney is considered false and misleading for purposes of the
FDCPA."I 3'
F.

Other false or misleading
representations

The FDCPA prohibits the "use of any
false, deceptive, or misleading representation"
in an attempt to collect a debt.'32 The FDCPA
enumerates sixteen such violations. Common
violations include: the false representation of
the character, amount, or legal status of the debt;
the representation or implication that nonpayment will result in arrest, imprisonment, seizure,
garnishment, attachment, or sale of the
consumer's property; the simulation of legal process; the use of any name other than the true name
of the debt collector; the use of names or statements that falsely suggest affiliation with government agencies; 133and the representation that
the debt collector is part of a credit reporting
agency when it is not.
Filing suit on obviously time-barred debts
has been held to violate the FDCPA. 34 Sending
a consumer a document entitled "final demand
before legal action" is illegal when it is not the
final demand used by the collection agency, or
when no legal action has been authorized.' 35
G.

Other unfair practices

Similarly, other courts have held that a
The FDCPA further prohibits "unfair or
debt collector's use of a form letter which is
unconscionable means to collect or attempt to
signed by an independent attorney who has no
collect any debt."'' 36 In addition to debt padding,
knowledge of and has not reviewed a particular
unfair practices include the solicitation and use
debt is an unfair collection practice. 30 In some
of post-dated checks under certain circumstances,
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the use of collect telephone calls and telegrams,
threats of illegal repossession, and the use of
postcards or envelopes that reveal the collection
purpose.
H.

Harassment or abuse

should be known, to be inconvenient to the consumer.'4' Absent knowledge to the contrary, prohibited practices would include communications
before 8:00 a.m. and after 9:00 p.m. local time.
The debt collector may not communicate
with the consumer known to be represented by
legal counsel 42 or at the consumer's place of
employment at which personal communications
are prohibited. 43 Collection letters mailed in care
of the consumer's attorney have been held to
violate this portion of the FDCPA.' 44 In addition, contacts with the consumer's relatives, other
than the spouse, violate the FDCPA. 145 Leaving
a message on an answering machine or voice mail
system may be an illegal third party communication if it is foreseeable that a third party with
whom the collector could not communicate directly would access the device or system.' 46 Finally, where the consumer has written to the debt
collector to cease further communications, continued collection contacts violate the FDCPA 47
On the other hand, where the debt collector did not have knowledge of the consumer's
previous bankruptcy and representation by legal
counsel, the FDCPA was not violated.' 48 The
bona fide error defense, discussed infra, may
protect an otherwise violative communication. 149

The FDCPA also prohibits "any conduct
the natural consequence of which is to harass,
oppress, or abuse any person in connection with
the collection of a debt."' 37 Among the conduct
specifically defined as harassment or abuse is the
threat of violence, use of obscene or profane language, publication of a list of debtors, advertisement of a debt in order to coerce payment, repeated telephone calls, and telephone calls without disclosure of the caller's identity. "[C]laims
under [the Act] should be viewed from the prospective of a consumer whose circumstances
make him relatively more susceptible to harassment, oppression, and abuse."' 38 Under this standard, various debt collection letters have been
139
found to be harassing, oppressive, and abusive.
Immediate return telephone calls by the debt
collector to the consumer containing abusive
comments also violate this section. 4°
Debt collectors will sometimes engage in
conduct that is both abusive and actually makes
it less likely that the creditor will be paid. For
Acquisition of location
J.
instance, contacts with consumers at their place
information
of employment in a manner that jeopardizes their
The debt collector may not communicate
jobs should be found to be unlawful under this
with someone other than the consumer except to
standard.
obtain location information. 5 ° In doing so, the
debt collector must identify himself, but may not
Communications with the
I.
discuss the debt. Unless requested by that third
consumer and others
party the contact may be made only once. HowThe FDCPA provides that the debt col- ever, if the consumer is represented by an attorlector may not communicate with the consumer ney, the debt collector may not communicate with
at any unusual time or place known, or that
1996
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any other person.
K.

Legal action by debt
collectors

A debt collector may bring an action to
enforce an interest in real property only where
the real property is located.' 5 ' Attorneys whose
collection activities are limited to purely legal
activities, such as the filing of collection actions
or mortgage foreclosures are subject to this restriction. 112
A collection action brought by a debt
collector on a personal obligation may be brought
only in the "judicial district" where the consumer
signed the contract or where the consumer resides at the time the action is filed. 53 A lawyer,
whose only action was to bring suit on behalf of
the creditor, violated the FDCPA where the action was filed in a jurisdiction other than that
where the contract was signed or the consumer
resided.' 54
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
in Newsom v. Friedman,has held that the six districts of the Municipal Department of the Circuit Court of Cook County are not distinct "judicial districts." The court accordingly held that a
debt collection lawyer did not violate the FDCPA
by filing a case in a municipal district in which
no contract was signed and the debtor did not
live. 55 The court declined to follow a FTC staff
opinion to the contrary. 5 6 Another staff opinion
states, with respect to outlying multi-county circuits in Illinois, that the debt collector must file
suit in the county in which the debtor resides or
signed the contract.' 57
The protection afforded by the FDCPA
is not waived by the consumer's failure to request a change of venue in the debt collection
action.' 58 By filing suit in an improper forum
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and forcing the consumer to either default or
appear in the improper forum (in person or by
counsel), the debt collector has already inflicted
the injury sought to be avoided by the Act.
The FDCPA cautions that it does not confer authority for any legal action by a debt collector. In many jurisdictions, a collection agency
may neither file suit in its own name, nor have
its attorney file suit in its name, and may not take
an assignment of a debt for collection and then
have its attorney file suit in its name. If the commencement of legal action by the debt collector
is unauthorized or constitutes an unauthorized
practice of law under state law, it will also violate the FDCPA.'59
L.

Furnishing deceptive forms

It is unlawful to design, compile, and furnish any forms knowing that such forms will be
used to create the false belief in the consumer
that a person other than the creditor is participating in the collection."j6 In one case, an attorney's
conduct in furnishing form letters which deceived
the consumer was held to violate the FDCPA.161
As discussed supra, an attorney who authorizes
a creditor or collection agency to use his letterhead, without his reviewing the files, also violates this section.
Remedies
Federal and state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction of FDCPA suits. 62 A single violation is sufficient to support a judgment for the
consumer. 63 The validity of the underlying debt,
(e.g. whether the consumer owes the alleged
obligation), is normally not relevant to the debt
collector's liability for violating of the FDCPA. '6
Thus, a successful consumer is entitled to an
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award of actual damages, statutory damages up
to $1,000, costs and attorney's fees. 165 Class action relief is also available."6
In FDCPA litigation brought against the
debt collector, the collector normally may not
167
assert a counterclaim for the underlying debt.
A.

Actual damages

A debt collector who violates any provi68
sion of the FDCPA is liable for actual damages.
State law requirements regarding the proof of
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional
distress are not applicable to actual damages
under the FDCPA. For example, in Smith v. Law
Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, 69 the U.S. District
Court for the District of Delaware instructed the
jury:
First, actual damages may be awarded to
the plaintiff as a result of the failure of defendants to comply with the Act. Actual
damages not only include any out-of-pocket
expenses, but also damages for personal humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish
or emotional distress.
You must determine a fair and adequate
award of these items through the exercise
of your judgment and experience in the affairs of the world after considering all facts
and circumstances presented during the trial
of this case. 7°
Although the consumers bore no out-of-pocket
losses, the jury awarded them $15,000 as actual
damages for emotional distress. The court
granted a remittitur to $3,000.
A number of other federal cases have
likewise held that emotional distress damages are
recoverable without regard to state law restric1996

tions on emotional distress damages. 7 ' For example, appellate courts in Ohio and Minnesota
have held that the debt collector was "liable for
any mental and emotional stress, embarrassment,
and humiliation caused" by improper debt col72
lection activities.
In an action alleging that an attorney systematically filed collection actions in improper
and inconvenient venues, an Illinois district court
held, in Holloway v. Pekay, the attorney's fees

assessed in the collection actions did not consti73
tute "actual damages."
B.

Statutory damages

Besides actual damages, the consumer
may be awarded "such additional damages as the
7
court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000."'1
The consumer does not need to show any actual
75
damages in order to recover statutory damages.
In determining the amount of statutory damages
in an individual action, the court considers "the
frequency and persistence of non-compliance by
the debt collector, the nature of such
non-compliance, and the extent to which the
non-compliance was intentional.' 76
The statutory language begs in unclear
as to what "not exceeding $1,000" refers. The
Sixth Circuit in Wright v. Finance Servs. of
Norwalk, Inc. 177 and the Eleventh Circuit in
Harperv. Better Business Servs., Inc. 7 8 have held

that it means that statutory damages of up to
$1,000 are available to one individual plaintiff
in one lawsuit. A majority of the district courts
considering the issue have reached the same conclusion.' 79 However, since a separate FDCPA

action could be filed for each communication or
other discrete act that violates the law, a substantial argument can be made that "action" means
"cause of action."
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The consumer need not prove the debt is
invalid"8 although payment of amounts not owed
as a result of an FDCPA violation would certainly
constitute actual damages.
C.

Vicarious liability

A collection agency is liable for the
FDCPA violations committed by either its employees or an attorney it hires.' 8 ' However, a
creditor is not vicariously liable for the FDCPA
violations of its debt collector unless it brings
itself within the provisions imposing liability for
using a third party name or furnishing deceptive
forms. The reason that a creditor is not vicariously liable is that the FDCPA manifests Congressional intent to exclude creditors from the
scope of the Act, unless they use the name of a
82
third party or furnish deceptive forms'
D.

Attorney's fees

The successful consumer is entitled to an
award of costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 83
Given the structure of the section, attorney's
fees should not be construed as a special or
discretionary remedy; rather the Act mandates an award of attorney's fees as a means
of fulfilling Congress' intent that the Act
should be enforced by debtors acting as pri184
vate attorneys general.

Circuit held that the proper rate at which an attorney bringing an FDCPA case is compensated
is the rate which his or her services command in
the marketplace as established by billings or
awards in other cases. Further, it is not proper to
have a special reduced rate in FDCPA cases because of the nature of the case or the $1,000 limi88
tation on actual damages.
E.

Bona fide error defense

In most cases, the debtor suing under the
FDCPA need not prove that a violation was intentional or negligent.' 89 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit in Gammon stated that the "FDCPA
is a strict liability statute."' 9 Of course, evidence
that the debt collector intended to mislead consumers tends to prove that he selected suitable
means to accomplish that end.' 9'
The FDCPA does provide an affirmative
defense to debt collectors which is similar to the
92
one found in the TILA:
A debt collector may not be held liable in
any action brought under this title if the debt
collector shows by a preponderance of the
evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error
notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such
93
error. 1
A mistaken view of the law is not excused

In Pipiles v. Credit Bureau of Lockport,

under the FDCPA. 194 Moreover, the maintain-

Inc., the Second Circuit held that although no
actual or statutory damages are awarded,
attorney's fees are available.'85 However, the
Fifth Circuit, in Johnson v. Eaton, reached the
opposite conclusion.'86
In Tolentino v. Friedman,187 the Seventh

ing of precautions designed to avoid errors is
mandatory. Thus, where the debt collector fails
to provide any evidence that it maintained proper
procedures to avoid error, the bona fide error
defense was held not to be available.' 95 Reliance by the debt collector on an informal FTC
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advisory opinion does not establish a bonafide
error defense.196
In the split decision of Smith v.
TransworldSystems, Inc., the Sixth Circuit found
that the debt collector demonstrated procedures
reasonably adapted to avoid violating the FDCPA
and, thereby, established a bona fide error defense.' 97 Although the debt collector, working
from plaintiff's California headquarters, sent a
second letter to the consumer shortly after receiving the consumer's cease and desist letter at
its Ohio office, the debt collector demonstrated
"procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any
such error"' 98 and established a bona fide error
defense. However, a dissenting judge wrote that
the debt collector "has intentionally structured
and implemented a system that defies compliance with the absolute duty mandated by [the
Act]."199

all communications with the client on the relevant subject, even without the consent of the
203
client.
F.

Jurisdiction

FDCPA litigation may be brought in either state or federal court. 2°4 A suit pursuant to
the FDCPA "may be brought in any appropriate
United States district court without regard to the
amount in controversy" or in the appropriate state
court within one year of the date of violation.2 5
In Mattson v. U.S. West Communications,Inc., a
split decision, the Eighth Circuit calculated the
one year statutory limitation to expire on the day
before the anniversary date.' ° The Eleventh Circuit has now followed the Eighth Circuit decision.20 7

Most courts have held that FDCPA litiA debt collector telephoning the con- gation is appropriately filed within the district
sumer before 8:00 a.m., demonstrated a bonafide where the consumer received the communica208
error defense where it erroneously failed to con- tion. This general rule has been upheld even
sider the consumer's time zone and no damage where the debt collector's letter had been forresulted from the calls. 2" Similarly, an uninten- warded to a district in which it did not do busi2 9
tional misstatement of the law of garnishment, ness. A jury trial is available in FDCPA ac2 10
where it was demonstrated that the collector's tions brought in federal court. The debt colemployee had been properly trained on wage lector normally may not bring counterclaims for
2
garnishment limitations, established a bonafide either the underlying debt " or for bad faith and
22
error defense.2°' In a similar matter, a debt col- harassment. '
lector, which posted a card containing the debt
collection warning required by the Act, required
G.
Class actions
its employees to recite this language immediately
The FDCPA contains special damage
in all telephone conversations, and trained em23
ployees regarding the warning established a bona provisions for class actions. ' Under the Act,
fide error defense to a claim based on failure to recovery of statutory damages for the class is limited to one percent of the debt collector's net
provide the proper warning.2 °2
An attorney who claims the bona fide worth or $500,000, whichever is less. The named
error defense based on information supplied by plaintiffs, however, can collect their full statuhis client, the creditor, may waive the attorney- tory damages. Furthermore, the damage limitaclient privilege. This privilege is with respect to tion does not apply to actual damages.
1996

Feature Article 0 321

FDCPA actions based on improper form
letters or charges, or similar standard practices,
are ideally suited for class action treatment. Under the "least sophisticated consumer" or "unsophisticated consumer" standard of liability, an
FDCPA claim for statutory damages presents no
issues of reliance or causation: "the question is
not whether the plaintiffs were deceived or misled, but rather whether an unsophisticated consumer would have been misled. 21 4 An FDCPA
class action alleging unauthorized charges may
technically require proof of causation, but the
payment of the unauthorized amount establishes
causation. Class actions have been certified unfalse attorder the FDCPA in cases involving 21
1~
cags
unutorze
215
ney letters, unauthorized charges, improper
form letters, 2 7 and the filing of suits in improper
218
venues.
Some courts have denied certification
where the per capita recovery of statutory damages was viewed as de minimis and there were
no actual damages.21 9 In Gammon v. G.C. Servs.,
L.P., a creative decision, the U. S. District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois approved of
cy pres distribution of statutory damages in this
type of situation.22°
The de minimis argument is obviously
inapplicable where unauthorized charges were
sought to be collected. Those class members who
paid the unauthorized charges have actual damages, and those class members who have not yet
paid are entitled to a judicial determination that
they do not owe the questioned charges.
H.

FTC official staff
commentary

staff's interpretations of the statute but does not
have the force or effect of law. It is not a formal
trade regulation rule or an advisory opinion of
the Commission, and thus, is not binding on the
Commission or the public.222 The FDCPA states:
"Neither the Commission nor any other agency
referred to in subsection (b) may promulgate
trade regulation rules or other regulations with
respect to the collection of debts by debt collec'223
tors as defined in this title.
In certain respects, the Commentary reflects the FTC's desire to narrow the FDCPA
rather than to enforce it as written. Most notably, it purports to support the efforts of the collection bar to obtain exemption from the
FDCPA's strictures. Consequently, several courts
have held portions of the FTC's staff commentary to be unpersuasive and flatly contrary to the
statute. 24
Currently, a debt collector's good faith
compliance with an FTC advisory opinion insulates the collector from liability. 225 However, at
the date of this writing, the FTC has not issued
any formal opinions.
Conclusion
Continuing evidence of debt collection
abuse and ongoing issues concerning the application of the FDCPA highlight the vital role
served by the statute. In the absence of effective
governmental enforcement, vigorous enforcement by private practitioners, particularly
through class actions, is essential to ensure that
debt collectors comply with this important consumer protection measure.

The FTC has published an Official Staff
Commentary on the FDCPA.22 ' The Staff Commentary is a guideline intended to clarify the
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Decisions specifically holding that checks are subject to the
FDCPA include Newman v. Checkrite California, Inc., 912
F Supp. 1354 (E.D. Cal. 1995); In re Scrimpsher, 17 B.R.
999 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1982); Keele v.Wexler, No. 95-C3483,
1995 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 13215 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 1995); Bass
v. Stopler, Kopritzinsky, Brewster, & Neidler, 95-C-470-C.
appealpending; and Narwick v. Wexler, 901 F. Supp. 1275
(N.D. Ill. 1995). Decisions which apply the FDCPA to checks
include Shifflett v.Accelerated Recovery Systems, Inc., No.
95-00070, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8515 (W.D. Va. May 23,
1996); Stewart v. Slaughter, 165 ER.D. 696 (M.D. Ga. 1996);
Byes v. Credit Bureau Enterprises, No. 95-239, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2870 (E.D. La. Mar. 5, 1996); Edwards v. National Business Factors, 897 F. Supp. 455 (D. Nev. 1995);
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Pearce v. Rapid Check Collection, 738 F. Supp. 334 (D.S.D.
1990); Hutchinson v. Russian, No. 92-2225, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18891 (D. Kan. Oct. 29, 1992); Holmes v. Telecredit
Service Corp., 736 F Supp. 1289 (D. Del. 1990); West v.
Costen, 558 F. Supp. 564, 581-84 (W.D. Va. 1983) (FDCPA
regulates addition of charges to dishonored checks issued in
payment for goods and services at grocery stores); Ransom
v. Telecredit Service Corp., H-91-897 (D. Md. Feb. 5, 1992)
(same); Taylor v. Checkrite, Ltd., 627 F. Supp. 415 (S.D. Ohio
1986) (FDCPA applied to attempt to collect bad check);
McGilvray v. Hallmark Financial Group, Inc., 891 F. Supp.
265 (E.D. Va. 1995); Bukumirovich v. Credit Bureau of Baton Rouge, Inc., 155 FR.D. 146 (M.D. La. 1994) (court held
that attempt to collect bad check is covered by the FDCPA
where "[t]he debt represented by the check is a consumer
debt"); Johnson v. Statewide Collections, Inc., 778 P.2d 93
(1989) (FDCPA applies to collection agency's attempt to collect check issued in payment for merchandise, and specifically regulates the addition of charges to the face amount of
such a check); See also, International Bureau of Fraud Control v. Clayton, 188 11. App. 3d 703, 544 N.E.2d 416 (1989)
(company which guarantees checks issued to merchants for
goods and services purchased was debt collector under the
Illinois Collection Agency Act, which applies to any person
who "offers services to collect an alleged debt").
2015 U.S.C. § 1692a (4).
21H.R.REP.

29, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). This was the version of the FDCPA passed by the House. The Senate Banking Committee substituted the text of its bill for H.R. 5294,
and the substitute bill was passed by both houses. S.Rep.
No. 382, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., at 1, 1977, reprinted in
USCCAN 1695, 1695-6. However, the definition of "debt"
was substantially identical in both bills. The Senate broadened the definition to include "alleged" debts and collection
of judgments. Significantly, prior versions of the FDCPA
limited "debt" to transactions "in which credit is offered or
extended to an individual." H.R. 13720,94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976); H.R. 29, 95th Cong., Ist Sess (1977).
22
H.R. Rep. No. 131, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977).
23
1 d. at 4.
24

United States v.Renner, No. 89-1503-CIV-T- I0(A) (M.D. Fla.
Nov. 7, 1989) (complaint filed); United States v. Telecheck,
Inc., Civ. No. JH-80-710 (D. Md. Mar. 27, 1980) (complaint
filed).

25

Statements of General Policy or Interpretation Staff Commentary on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 53 Fed. Reg.
50,097, 50,102 (FTC 1988).

26

Perez v. Slutsky, No. 94-C6137, 1994 WL 698519, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17711 (N.D. II1. Dec. 12, 1994).

27

Travieso v. Gutman, No. 94-CV-5756, 1995 WL 704778, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17804, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1995).
2
1Id. See also Emanuel v. American Credit Exchange, 870 F.2d
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poration within the scope of the Act and (2) violate the Act's
Section 807(10) [§1692e(10)] and 807(14) [§1692e(14)].
[f.n.: Section 807(10) prohibits the use of false representations and deceptive collection means when collecting debts.
Section 807(14) prohibits the use of any name other than the
true name of the collector when the collector is engaged in
collection activities.] The Commission staff has stated that it
would generally be a violation of 807(10) for a creditor to
use a controlled entity to collect its own debts under a name
that conveys the impression that a third party is collecting the
debts.

805 (2d Cir. 1989) (treating rent as a "debt" subject to the
FDCPA).
29

Riter v. Moss & Bloomberg, 932 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Il1. 1996);
Vosatka v. Wolin-Levin, Inc., No. 94-C4129, 1995 WL
4439507, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10415 (N.D. 111.July II,
1995); Azar v. Hayter, 874 F. Supp. 1314, 1318-19 (N.D. Fla.
1995), aff'd without opinion, 66 F.3d 342 (11 th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 133 L.Ed. 2d 666 (1996). Accord Archer v.
Beasley, No. 90-2576, 1991 WL 34889, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2994 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 1991).

-"Adams v. Law Offices of Stuckert & Yates, 926 F Supp. 521
(E.D. Pa. 1996).
3'Id. at 526.
32
Staub v. Harris, 626 F.2d 275 (3d Cir. 1980).
"Mabe v. G.C. Services, L.P., No. Civ.A.93-0234-B, 1994 WL
6920, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162 (W.D. Va. Jan. 6, 1994),
aff'd, 32 F.3d 86 (4th Cir. 1994); Battye v. Child Support
Servs., 873 F. Supp. 103 (N.D. I11.
1994); Brown v. Child
Support Advocates, 878 F. Supp. 1451 (D. Utah. 1994).
'Shorts v. Palmer, 155 FR.D. 172 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
'-Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d 1163 (3d Cir.
1987).
- I5U.S.C. § 1692a (6).

Under the circumstances outlined in your letter, and in view of
the ownership overlap and on-going business connections, it
appears that ABC Corporation could not successfully maintain that XYZ was an independent collection entity at the same
time it sought 803(6)(B) exemption[.]
"The FTC Staff Commentary to the FDCPA states:
3.
Application of definition to creditor using another
name. Creditors are generally excluded from the definition
of "debt collector" to the extent that they collect their own
debts in their own name. However the term specifically applies to "any creditor who, in the process of collecting his
own debts, uses any name other than his own which would
indicate that a third person is" involved in the collection.
A creditor is adebt collector for purposes of this act if:
- He uses aname other than his own to collect his debts,
including a fictitious name.

37Id.
39Id.

"Perry v. StewartTitle Co., 756 F2d 1197, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985);
Coppola v. Connecticut Student Loan Found., No. N-87-398,
1989 WL 47419, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3415 (D. Conn. Mar.
22, 1989).
E.g., a receiver or trustee of a corporate creditor or the personal representative of an individual creditor.
4115 U.S.C. § 1692e.
"'

'Id. § 1692a (6).
43An FTC opinion letter of Sept. 19, 1985 discusses a situation
in which XYZ and ABC were two entities under common
ownership, XYZ handled the collection of ABC's delinquent
debts, XYZ's principal business was not debt collection, and
XYZ failed to disclose its relationship with ABC in effecting
collections. The FTC stated that these facts would result in
an FDCPA violation:
[T]he [affiliate] exclusion does not necessarily apply if a creditor "inthe process of collecting his own debts, uses any name
other than his own which would indicate that athird person is
attempting to collect such debts." Strictly speaking, this provision does not make XYZ subject to theAct because XYZ is
not the creditor. However, because the collection activity
would assumably be conducted under the XYZ name, its debt
collection activities may subject the creditor, ABC Corporation, to the Act. For example, if, as your letter suggests (and
is necessary for XYZ to come within the 803(6)(B)
[§1692a(6)(B) exception), XYZ is not fully independent of
ABC Corporation but uses a name which conveys the impression that it is independent, the use of such name in collecting ABC Corporation's debts would (a) bring ABC Cor-
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- His salaried attorney employees who collect debts
use stationery that indicates that attorneys are employed by
someone other than the creditor or are independent or separate from the creditor...
- The creditor's collection division or related corporate collector is not clearly designated as being affiliated with
the creditor; however, the creditor is not a debt collector if
the creditor's correspondence is clearly labeled as being from
the "collection unit of the (creditor's name)," since the creditor is not using a "name other than his own" in that instance.
Statements of General Policy or Interpretation Staff Commentary on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 53 Fed.
Reg. 50,097, 50,102 (FTC 1988) (emphasis added).
45Grammatico v. Sterling, 91 CV 467 (N.D.N.Y. 1991).
4Id.

"Little v. World Financial Network, Inc., Civ. No. N-89-346,
1990 WL516554, (D. Conn. July 26, 1990).
"Britton v. Weiss, No. 89-CV- 143, 1989 WL 148663, 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14610 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 1989).
at *2, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14610, at *6-7 (N.D.N.Y.
Dec. 8, 1989).
5Id. at *4, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14610, at *10-1 I. See also
Cramer v. First of America Bank Corp., No. 93-C3189, 1993
WL 478997, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16276 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
16 1993) (opinion later withdrawn per settlement). Cramer
bought aused car which was financed by the "National Bank
of Bloomington." He defaulted and the National Bank of
Bloomington repossessed the car. Ten years later, after hav4Id.
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ing lived in another state and heard nothing more about the
debt, Cramer received a collection demand that (i) came from
"First of America Bank Corporation" and (ii) did not comply
with the FDCPA. At some point during the intervening decade First of America Bank Corporation acquired, through a
series of mesne transactions, the business of what was once
"National Bank of Bloomington," and operated it under the
name of "First of America Bank - McLean" and "First of
America Bank - Champion." Neither the collection letter
nor any previous document disclosed the corporate relationships. The court found the FDCPA applicable.
11Dickenson v. Townside TV & Appliance, Inc., 770 F Supp.
1122, 1128 (S.D.W. Va. 1990) ("[A] creditor may use any
established name under which it is known to collect its debts
from a particular debtor as long it has consistently dealt with
such debtor since the beginning of the credit relationship at
issue under such name"). Id.
52Young v. Lehigh Corp., 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,790,
No. 80-C4376 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11575 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
26, 1989); Meads v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc., 686 F.
Supp. 330 (S.D. Ga. 1988) (debt owed on Visa card issued by
Citibank (North Dakota), N. A.; dunning letters on Citicorp
Credit Services, Inc. letterhead).
53Vasquez v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 96-C277 I, 1996 WL 523044,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13577 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 1996).
"4Perry v. Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d 1197, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985),
citing S. REP. No. 382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 3, reprinted
in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1698.
5Games v. Cavazos, 737 F. Supp. 1368, 1385 (D. Del. 1990).
"The word 'regularly' means 'normally, usually, or customarily.' [citations] The Act was not intended to cover an entity
that collects a debt for another in an isolated instance, but it
does apply to entities that collect debts for others 'in the regular
course of business.' [citations]"Id. See also Cacace v. Lucas,
775 F. Supp. 502, 505 (D. Conn. 1990) (attorney who represented four collection agencies, filed over 150 collection suits
in a two-year period, and sent one particular collection letter
over 125 times in a 14-month period was a debt collector
even though debt collection was merely incidental to his primary law practice).
1

6Games v. Cavazos, 737 F. Supp. 1368, 1384 (D. Del. 1990).
7
BNA Banking Report, v. 61, no. 21, p. 899 (Dec. 6, 1993).

- Kimber v. Federal Financial Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1480 (M.D.
Ala. 1987).
591d. at 1485 (emphasis added).
6wCirkot v. Diversified, 839 F. Supp. 941 (D. Conn. 1993).
61

Id. See also Commercial Service of Perry v. Fitzgerald, 856
P.2d 58,62 (Colo.App. 1993) ("[A] company which takes an
assignment of a debt in default, and is a business the principal purpose of which is to collect debts, may be subject to the
Act, even if the assignment is permanent and without any
further rights in the assigner"); Wagner v. American Nat'l
Educ. Corp., Civ. No. N-81-541 (PCD) (D.Conn., Jan. 3, 1984)
("The statute permits service debt collection free of the act if,
when the debt was acquired, it was not in default"); Coppola
v. Connecticut Student Loan Found., No. N-87-398, 1989WL

1996

47419,1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3415 (D. Conn. Mar. 22, 1989),
In Coppola, the court stated:
The parties agree that the debt in this case was not in default
when CALS began to service the loan for NELLIE MAE. In
these circumstances, CALS is excluded from the Act's definition of "debt collector" by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii). See
Letter from Attorney Rachelle V. Browne, Division of Credit
Practice, Federal Trade Commission, to John Silko (dated
February 21, 1985) (informal FTC opinion noting that 15
U.S.C. §1692a(6) "would exempt servicing activities for loans
that were not in default at the time they were transferred" to
New Mexico state student loan servicing foundation), reprinted in Text of Informal FTC Letters (1986 Supp.)App. H
(Sept. 19, 1985); see also Perry v. Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d
1197, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985) (mortgage servicing company servicing a debt not in default when assigned is exempt from
definition of "debt collector"); Kimber v. Federal Financial
Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1480, 1486 (M.D. Ala. 1987) (relevant
distinction is whether debt was in default when assigned to
collector). Accordingly, CSLF is entitled to summary judgment in this case because CSLF and its relevant department,
CALS, is not a"debt collector" under theAct. Coppola, 1989
WL 47419, at *2-3 (emphasis added).
62

"Questions andAnswersAbout Interpretations of the Fair Debt
Collection PracticesAct,"Regulatory Compliance Watch, vol.
2, no. 4, p. 5 (Feb. 3, 1992).

63

Pub. L. No. 99-361, 100 Stat. 768 (deleting former 15 U.S.C. §
1692a(6)(F), which excluded from the definition of "debt
collector" "any attorney-at-law collecting a debt as an attorney on behalf of and in the name of a client.")

"Crossley v. Lieberman, 90 B.R. 682,694 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd,
868 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1989).
65Fair

Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 99-361, 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1756-57.

'Heintz v. Jenkins, 115 S.Ct. 1489 (1995).
67Stojanovski v. Strobl & Manoogian, P.C., 783 F. Supp. 319,
321 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
MId. at 322.
9Cacace v. Lucas, 775 F Supp. 502, 505 (D. Conn. 1990).
"Mertes v. Devitt, 734 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. Wis. 1990).
7'Stojanovski v. Strobl & Manoogian, P.C., 783 F. Supp. 319,
322 (E.D. Mich. 1992). See also Cacace v. Lucas, 775 F
Supp. 502 (D. Conn. 1990); Hartd v. Presbry & Associates,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13419 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1i,1996); In re
Littles, 90 Bankr. 669 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd as modified, Crossley v. Lieberman, 90 Bankr. 682 (E.D. Pa. 1988),
aff'd, 868 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1989).
However, in Garrett v. Derbes, No. CIV.A.93-823, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11519 (N.D. La. July 8, 1996), a court held that
an attorney who allowed his name to be used in 639 collection letters without obtaining or receiving the files was not
subject to the FDCPA because he spent essentially no time
on the files. The decision seems obviously wrong. If the
attorney had received the files as he was professionally obligated to do, he would have spent a substantial amount of time
on them.
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73

93

74

94

Taylor v. Checkrite, Ltd., 627 F. Supp. 415 (S.D. Ohio 1986).
Holmes v. Telecredit Service Corp., 736 F. Supp. 1289 (D. Del.
1990) (The FDCPA's definitional language, "owed or due
another," means originally owed or due to another.) Kimber
v. Federal Financial Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1480, 1485 (M.D.
Ala. 1987).

1 Jordan v. Kent Recovery Servs., 731 F. Supp. 652 (D. Del.
1990); Larranaga v. Mile High Collection and Recovery Bureau, Inc., 807 F. Supp. I I I (D.N.M. 1992); Colton v. Ford
Motor Credit Co., No. 3916, 1986 WL 8538 (Ohio Ct. App.
July 30, 1986).
7615 U.S.C. § 1692a (3).
77Wright v. Finance Service of Norwalk, Inc., 22 F.3d 647 (6th
Cir. 1994); Riveria v. MAB Collections, Inc., 682 F. Supp.
174 (W.D.N.Y. 1988).
7
1West
v. Costen, 558 F. Supp. 564 (W.D. Va. 1983). One need
not be a consumer to recover under provisions of the FDCPA
which apply to any "person," e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Other
provisions of the FDCPA, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1692c, only protect a "consumer."
7915 U.S.C. § 1692a (3).
91

Tolentino v. Friedman, 833 F Supp. 697 (N.D. I11.1993), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 46 F3d 645 (7th Cir. 1995) (debt
collector sent consumers a copy of the summons and complaint prior to service accompanied by an "IMPORTANT
NOTICE" discussing the consequences of filing bankruptcy).

" Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1993); Graziano v.
Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, II1 (3d Cir. 1991); Smith v.
Transworld Systems, Inc., 953 F.2d 1025, 1028-29 (6th Cir.
1992); Swanson v. Southern Oregon Credit Service, Inc.,
869 F.2d 1222, 1225-26 (9th Cir. 1988); Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168 (11 th Cir. 1985); Russey v. Rankin,
911 F. Supp. 1449 (D.N.M. 1995); Bukumirovich v. Credit
Bureau of Baton Rouge, Inc., 155 FR.D. 146 (M.D. La. 1994);
United States v. National Financial Services, 820 F. Supp.
228,232 (D. Md. 1993)aff'd 1996 U.S.Appl. LEXIS 26645
(4th Cir., Oct. 12, 1996); Moore v. Ingram & Assocs., 805 F
Supp. 7 (D.S.C. 1992).
2
Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1993).
3 Gammon

v. G.C. Services L.P., 27 F.3d 1254 (7th Cir. 1994).

1Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1993).
"5 Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222 (7th Cir. 1996).
mid. at 226-27.
7

Id. at 227.

"Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 1996).
"115 U.S.C. § 1692g (a).
'Id. § 1692g (b).
'9 Rivera

v. MAB Collections, Inc., 682 F Supp. 174 (W.D.N.Y.
1988).

9 Swanson v. Southern Oregon Credit Service, Inc., 869 F2d
1222 (9th Cir. 1988).
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Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 1996).
ld.; Adams v. Law Offices of Stuckert & Yates, 926 F. Supp.
521 (Ed. Pa. 1996).

91Adams v. Law Offices of Stuckert & Yates, 926 F Supp. 521
(Ed. Pa. 1996).
96
Miller v.Payco-General American Credits, Inc., 943 F2d 482,
484 (4th Cir. 1991).
I Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1991) (threat to
sue if payment was not received within ten days rendered the
validation notice ineffective); Cortright v. Thompson, 812 F.
Supp. 772, 778 (N.D. II1. 1992) (attorney demand letter stating that "in the event the balance is not paid in full or satisfactory payment arrangements made within ten days, it may
be necessary to file at any time thereafter a lawsuit to recover
the amount due if so requested by my client... Although the
letter is not as threatening visually as some described in cases
finding violations of § 1692g(a), [citation], defendant's letter
appears on law firm stationery and states that it may be necessary to file a lawsuit at any time after 10 days .... ");
Swanson v. Southern Oregon Credit Service, Inc., 869 E2d
1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988) (§ 1692g notice accompanied by
demand that account be paid within 10 days to avoid adverse
credit report is not effectively conveyed, and demand violates statute; such a communication would "lead the least
sophisticated debtor, and quite probably even the average
debtor, only to one conclusion: he must ignore the right to
take 30 days to verify his debt and act immediately or he will
be remembered as a deadbeat in the 'master file' of his local
collection agency and will, accordingly, lose his 'most valuable asset,' his good credit rating"); United States v. National
Financial Services, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 228 (D. Md. 1993) (letter containing § 1692g notice and also stating that matter
would be referred to an attorney in ten days violated § 1692g
because the ten day demand "contradict[s] the validation
notice's declaration that the debtor has thirty days to dispute
the debt"); Russey v. Rankin, 911 E Supp. 1449 (D.N.M.
1995).
9
Beeman v. Lacy, Katzen, Ryen & Mittleman, 892 F Supp. 405
(N.D.N.Y.1995).
9Riveria v. MAB Collections, Inc., 682 E Supp. 174 (W.D.N.Y.
1988); Ost v. Collection Bureau, Inc., 493 E Supp. 701
(D.N.D. 1980); Phillips v. Amana Collection Services, Nos.
89-CV-I152S, 90-CV-149S, 1992 WL 227839, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13558 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 1992). See also,
Rabideau v. Management Adjustment Bureau, 805 F. Supp.
1086 (W.D.N.Y. 1992); Colmon v. Payco-General American
Credits, 774 F Supp. 691 (D. Conn. 1990). Contra Blackwell
v. Professional Business Services, Inc., 526 F. Supp. 535 (N.D.
Ga. 1981).
""T Miller v. Payco-General American Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482
(4th Cir. 1991); Woolfolk v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 783 F Supp.
724, 726 (D. Conn. 1990).
Sandlin v. Shapiro & Fishman, 919 F Supp. 1564 (M.D. Fla.
1996).
"'2 Jang v. A.M. Miller Assoc., Inc., Nos. 95-C4919, 95-C6665,
1996 WL 435096, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10883 (N.D. Ill.
July 30, 1996).
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13 15 U.S.C § 1692e (5).
1°4Newman v. Checkrite of California, 912 F. Supp. 1354 (E.D.
Cal. 1995).
"o5
Bentley v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, 6 F.3d 60 (2d Cir.
1993); Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1991);
See Pipiles, 886 F.2d at 22 (48 hour notice); Oglesby v. Rotche,
No. 93-C4183, 1993 WL 460841, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15687 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 5, 1993).
" Rosa v. Gaynor, 784 F. Supp. 1,5 (D. Conn. 1989).
7 Sibley v. Firstcollect, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 469 (M.D. La. 1995);
Russey v. Rankin, 911 F. Supp. 1449 (D.N.M. 1995); Kuhn
v. Account Control Technology, Inc., 865 F Supp. 1443,
1451-52 (D. Nev. 1994); Gaetano v. Payco ofWisconsin, Inc.,
774F Supp. 1404, 1413-14 (D. Conn. 1990). Contra Wade
v. Regional Credit Ass'n, 87 F3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1996).
"°Wienerv. Bloomfield, 901 F. Supp. 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
S9Oglesby v. Rotche, No. 93-C4183, 1993 WL 460841, 1993
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15687 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 5, 1993) (threat to
garnish all wages and attach all property); Woolfolk v. Van
Ru Credit Corp., 783 F Supp. 724 (D. Conn. 1990) (oppressive list of post-judgment remedies); Seabrook v. Onondaga
Bureau of Medical Economics, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 81
(N.D.N.Y. 1989) (threat to garnish wages in excess of amounts
permitted under federal law); Cacace v. Lucas, 775 F Supp.
502 (D. Conn. 1990) (letter stating that litigation could result
in seizure of real estate and bank account deceptive; mere
filing of litigation could not have any of stated effects). See
Kleczy v. First Federal Credit Control, Inc., 21 Ohio Ct.App.
3d 56, 486 N.E.2d 204 (1984) ("avoid further action" was
not sufficiently threatening to violate § 1692(e)(5)).
110 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (5).
11Id. § 1692f (1).
"2West v. Costen, 558 F Supp. 564, 581 (W.D. Va. 1983).
"3 Id.; In re Scrimpsher, 17 B.R. 999 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1982)
(unauthorized "service charge" on NSF checks); Clark v.
Marine Midland Bank, 67A.D.2d 846,413 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1979)
(same).
"4Strange v. Wexler, 796 F.Supp. 1117 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
"5Jenkins v. Heintz, 25 F.3d 536 (7th Cir. 1994), aff'd, 115 S.
Ct. 1489 (1995).
" 6 People ex rel. Daley v. Datacom Sys. Corp., 146 111. 2d 1,585
N.E.2d 51 (1991) (collection agency hired to collect parking
fines tacked on unauthorized fees); Cacace v. Lucas, 775 F.
Supp. 502 (D. Conn. 1990) (lawyer demanded excessive
amounts); Duran v. Credit Bureau of Yuma, 93 FR.D. 607
(D. Ariz. 1982) (unauthorized collection fees); Sandlin v.
Shapiro & Fishman, 919 F Supp. 1564 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
In addition to §§ 1692f and 1692e (5), debt padding
also violates § 1692e(2), which prohibits "[t]he false representation of ... (A) the character, amount, or legal status of
any debt; or (B) any services rendered or compensation which
may be lawfully received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt." 15. U.S.C. § 1692e(2).
"7 Newman

1996

v. Checkrite of California, 912 F Supp.at 1368-69.

"IIllinois has anon-standard provision that expressly allows such
damages for a dishonored check. 810 ILCS 5\3-806 (West
1993).
" 9 Ducrest v. Alco Collections, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 459 (M.D. La.
1996).
"Baker v. G.C. Services Corp., 677 F2d 775 (9th Cir. 1982).
121 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d (5); 1692b (6); 1692c (a) (i)-(2); 1692e
(8); 1692j (a).
2
1 Id. § 1692k (c).
I"Id. § 1692a (3).
' 24Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1993).
121Id. at 1321.
v. Lieberman, 868 F2d 566, 570 (3d Cir. 1989).
' Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222 (7th Cir. 1996).
26Crossley
27
21Id. at

228.

'9Id. at 229.
v. Thomas Richards & Co., 759 F Supp. 1456, 146 12 (C.D. Cal. 1991) ("the letter falsely suggests to the least
sophisticated debtor that an attorney has been retained to collect his or her particular debt. Thus, the letter implies to the
recipient that TRC considers the debt to be more serious
than TRC, in fact, considers it to be .... The representation
that independent outside counsel has been hired may unjustifiably frighten the unsophisticated debtor into paying a debt
that he or she does not owe. The FDCPA must be construed
to proscribe this means of collection") (emphasis added).
Accord United States v. Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 667
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